15 May 1969
During the morning hours, the gunships and ten artillery firebases
repeated their almost incessant bombing of the enemy positions as they had done the
previous days, reducing the mountain and ridgelines to  smoldering piles of blackened and smoking
tree stumps, churned-up earth, denuded of vegetation.
At 1200, A and B Companies attacked the same two fingers that they had
assaulted the previous day. Sfc. Louis Garza led 4th Platoon from B Company over the same
ground, and two claymore mines hit and wounded his two point men. Garza called for air
support. After the strike with 250-pound bombs, Garza and his platoon moved forward,
firing their machine guns and M16s, overran the bunkers, and killed eight NVAs. But sniper
and machine-gun fire halted his advance. He marked the enemy position with smoke and
called for helicopter gunships. Unfortunately, the first gunship salvoed an entire rack of
rockets into B Company's CP, killing Pfc. Joseph Price and wounding fifteen others,
including the CO, Capt. Charles Littman. Capt. John C. "Butch" Chappelle
replaced him. Higher up the trail, Garza and his men were hit with an NVA counterattack
that Pfcs. Snyder and Maryniewski drove off with machine-gun fire.
Lieutenant Frank McGreevy and his 1st Platoon of A Company were stopped
in front of a line of bunkers. He tried to move forward but a machine-gun team, led by Sp4
Michael Lyden laying down covering fire, was hit by return fire that killed Lyden.
McGreevy's platoon was now cut in half, and he ordered a withdrawl. Honeycutt called off
the attack and told B and C Companies to set up a joint NDP. He also called in his
artillery liaison officer and gave him a message to get back to the division staff.
"I want you to make sure that everybody gets this. And I mean the artillery people
and the gunship pilots and the liaison officers . . everybody. I don't want any more ARA
out here if they can't shoot the enemy instead of us. I'm tired of taking more casualties
from friendlies than from the enemy. The next goddamn sonofabitch who comes out here and
shoots us up, we're gonna shoot his fuckin' ass down. And that's final. Now you go back
and tell 'em that."
During the night, NVA sappers out of Laos moved up the draw and tried to
hit C Company and the battalion CP. A "Shadow" gunship, a C-119 armed with three
miniguns, took them under fire. That evening the CO of 1/506th reported to Honeycutt that
he was within 1,200 meters southeast of the lower LZ.
16 May 1969
A first-light check by C Company found fourteen NVA bodies in their
area. The day began just like the previous six days: saturation bombing, air strikes, and
ceaseless artillery volleys onto the known or  suspected enemy locations. Honeycutt told Sanders to stop
finding an avenue to the top of the mountain, realizing that D Company's three brutal days
in the ravine was enough. He ordered D Company back up the ridge to secure B Company's LZ.
Honeycutt planned his attack on the mountain with A Company in the lead, supported by a
flanking attack by 1/506th. But the 1/506th was in trouble in its area. One NVA platoon
hit the lead elements of the battalion that was receiving heavy fire from Hills 800, 900,
and 916. The NVA attacks prevented the 1/506th from getting to the mountain in time to
support the 3/187th's assault. Honeycutt called off the attack without the help 0f
1/506th. Honeycutt was frustrated. He thought that 1/506th was taking too long, and he
sensed that the NVA was bringing up reinforcements from Laos to beef up the mountain.
17 May 1969
Honeycutt put the day "on hold" and had his men prepare for
the assault the next day by stockpiling supplies, passing out new protective gas masks,
and bringing up concussion grenades for use against the dug-in NVA in bunkers. The
1/506th, fighting up the mountain crest and taking casualties, had still not arrived in a
support position. There was little contact during the hours of darkness.
18 May 1969 -->
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